The 
Introduction
The introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 1999, together with the definition of the eight Millennium Development Goals in 2000, can be seen as the start of a "new aid paradigm", focused on achieving tangible results in poverty reduction (Renard, 2005) . This aid paradigm calls for fundamental changes in the relationships between donors and aid recipients, moving towards the PRS principles of national ownership and partnership. • Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinate development actions;
• Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures;
• Harmonization: Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective;
• Managing for results: Managing resources and improving decision-making for results;
• Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.
In fact, these five principles are in line with, and build on, the earlier five principles of the PRS approach: ownership, partnership, and results orientation based on long-term and comprehensive poverty reduction plans. In particular, the Paris Declaration sees broadly owned national and sector development strategies, translated into results oriented plans, as the basis for achieving national ownership and leadership of the aid process, and for improving donor alignment and harmonization. The PRS approach envisaged that PRSPs would facilitate a switch from project aid to programme aid, 1 and that this change in aid modality would foster donor coordination under government leadership. The Paris Declaration stipulates that by 2010, 66 per cent of all aid would be given in the context of "programme based approaches".
Programme based approaches are meant to support national or sector development plans. The aid provided may be programme aid (in the form of general budget support or sector budget support) but also project aid if provided within sector wide approaches. 2 This means that PRSPs, and other national or sector development plans, lie at the heart of the new consensus on aid effectiveness. The introduction of PRSPs is usually seen as the beginning of the new aid paradigm.
The question is to what extent this new aid approach can be implemented. This paper assesses the actual progress in the implementation in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua --three Latin
American countries that were required to produce and implement PRSPs in order to qualify for debt reduction under the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) Initiative. The results are disappointing, and the main question then to be answered is why this is so. Two possibilities emerge: the new aid paradigm was too ambitious and based on unrealistic assumptions, or the disappointing results are due to specific circumstances in these three countries. Two such specific circumstances come to mind. First, all three countries experienced frequent government changes, which may have hampered long-term commitments to national strategies, as well as stable partnership relationships with donors. Second, progress towards the Paris Agenda may have been hindered by the particular composition of the donor group in 4 these countries. Compared with other highly aid dependent countries, these countries have a larger presence of donors that are less enthusiastic about the new aid paradigm, such as the US, Spain, Japan, and Canada. The paper concludes that, although these two factors played some role in hindering progress, the model itself -and particularly the idea that national plans can be the basis for lasting changes in donor government relations --is also flawed in important respects.
The next section of this paper examines the assumptions behind, and expected results of, the new aid paradigm and analyzes why these expected results may not always be forthcoming.
The paper then goes on to examine the implementation of the new aid paradigm in the three countries, focusing on the period after 2000. Section 3 analyzes whether the fundamentals of the new aid paradigm were in place: national ownership and leadership of the aid process on the basis of national and sector plans, and describes the extent to which aid to these countries was given in the context of programme based approaches. Sections 4 and 5 assess whether the principles of the Paris Declaration are implemented within these approaches, in particular for general budget support and for some examples of programme based approaches at sector level. The final section concludes.
The new aid paradigm: expectations and possible contradictions
The new aid paradigm is the result of two kinds of discontent with previous aid experiences.
First, there was a lot of critique of the policy conditionality that had accompanied structural adjustment loans of IMF and World Bank. The concern was that conditionality was not very effective: countries concede to the conditions because they badly need the aid money, but in practice they only implement what they intended to do anyway (Killick et al., 1999, Dollar and Svensson, 2000) . Second, there was a growing conviction among donors that the most commonly used aid modality, namely that of project aid, had also failed. Projects were often donor driven, and there were too many of them, each with their own procedures, reporting and monitoring requirements and separate implementation units. The lack of donor coordination led to high transaction costs for both donors and recipients. Furthermore, donors' attempts to control implementation and reporting in projects undermined local capacities and reduced the sustainability of the projects themselves. Both concerns pointed to the importance of increasing domestic ownership of the activities funded through aid (by reducing donorimposed conditionality) and of increasing alignment with national systems and harmonization among donors. To achieve this, the preferred aid modality is programme aid.
Although this represents the dominant perspective on the problems with aid and the need for a new paradigm, there is also another "narrative" behind the new aid paradigm --one that casts a more negative view of the aid recipient (Renard, 2005) . From this second perspective, project aid failed because of inadequate policies and governance in the recipient countries.
Following this view, conditionality did not work because donors were too lenient with governments, which would imply that donors should keep and even strengthen policy conditionality.
Both perspectives on conditionality and ownership circulate in the donor community and sometimes even within one donor agency. This is what Rogerson (2005) calls the "schizophrenia" of the aid industry: conditionality is still important in aid practice, but the Paris Declaration is silent about it. Analyzing the Paris Declaration in more detail, it is clear that it contains elements of both narratives. Under "ownership", the Paris Declaration stipulates that partner countries exercise leadership in the elaboration of national and sector 6 development strategies, plans which would presumably eliminate the need for donor-imposed policy conditions. However, the requirement to elaborate a PRSP and related sector strategies is itself a condition. Furthermore, one can question the extent to which real ownership, in the sense of control (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009 ), of these strategies is possible, given that they must be approved by the donors. A related problem is that even if governments are committed to implementing their poverty reduction strategies, it cannot be taken for granted that they have the capacity to do so. In practice, this would hinder the full alignment of aid with a government's stated priorities.
If donors feel that national governments lack ownership of their own plans or are unable to implement them, donors will not see the strategies as a credible "commitment device" -evidence that governments are truly committed to achieving the objectives laid out in the plans. Donors are not likely to provide general or sector budget support without being assured that certain policies will be implemented or objectives met. If they question government commitment to implement a plan that is consistent with the donor agenda, they will set additional conditions for general or sector budget support. This practice conflicts with the idea of "ownership", but also, in part, with "mutual accountability" and "partnership". For example, if donors are not satisfied with government policies, they may withdraw committed aid money. Recipient governments do not have the same level of leverage in the relationship.
In practice, withdrawal of committed aid reduces the predictability of aid flows --an element of "mutual accountability" in the Paris Declaration.
Another questionable assumption and contradiction in the new aid paradigm is that PRSPs, or national development strategies, are supposed to reflect a national, long-term consensus on the preferred development policy and on how to reduce poverty. This rational planning and technocratic approach to poverty reduction not only conflicts with the political nature of poverty itself, but also with the political nature of policy making. It is unrealistic to expect a lasting consensus on the nature of the poverty problem and on how to tackle it. Policy making is not a rational process in which the best possible way to achieve a shared goal is defined, but is always a matter of compromises and incremental small steps ( Van Gunsteren, 1976; Dijkstra, 2005) . The fact that policy-making occurs incrementally also reduces the chances of achieving operational links between overall national strategies and actual policies. All this makes it difficult to use a national development or poverty reduction plan as basis for aid alignment and aid harmonization.
There may also be other constraints to the harmonization and alignment agenda, both on the donor side and on the recipient side. Potential difficulties may also arise when we consider the extent of alignment and harmonization of aid within programme based approaches. While general and sector budget support probably meet the alignment objective (using national systems), harmonization is not always advanced: it can be provided individually by single donor agencies, each with its own disbursement criteria and policy conditions. On the other hand, Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) usually advance the harmonization objective because they are, by definition, an effort undertaken by a group of donors. However SWAps will not necessarily imply alignment with country systems. The latter depends on the extent to which common funds and projects within SWAps use government systems of planning, budgeting, administering, procurement, execution, and monitoring and evaluation.
From PRSPs to programme based approaches in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras

Ownership through national plans
When the first PRSPs were written in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, the context for donor recipient relations was different in the three countries. Bolivia enjoyed long-term donor support for its stabilization and reform programme carried out since 1986. The country was a relative success story in donor government relations and in donor coordination. Over the years, it became clear that the existence of approved "plans" did not say much about national ownership of and commitment to poverty reduction policies. The first PRSPs were technocratic exercises written for the donors, with limited priority setting and hardly any links to the political priorities of the day. Implementation of these plans was largely limited to policies that were already under way, or policies and projects financed by the donors. Later plans often did represent "owned" political views, but these plans were usually not accepted by the donors. Donors' reasons for rejecting the plans included insufficient participation (Bolivia 2003) and that poverty reduction measures and social policies were not sufficiently covered and that the plan was not sufficiently operational (Nicaragua 2003 (Nicaragua -2005 . In Nicaragua, the second PRSP, finally approved by donors after changes had been made, was also poorly implemented: this plan was made by the Bolaños government and the Ortega government (in power since 2007) has other priorities.
Government leadership and donor coordination in aid
In the logic of the PRS approach, the PRSPs were intended to be an instrument for facilitating government leadership and donor coordination in the aid process. Government-donor working groups or round tables were to be mechanisms for organizing discussions with donors about how to support these national plans, and related sector plans, in a coordinated way. In practice, government leadership in coordinating aid in the three countries has varied a great deal, over time and across countries.
In In Nicaragua, sector roundtables existed during the Bolaños government, but their level of performance varied. As in the other two countries, donors in Nicaragua said that performance depended on government leadership. It was possible to establish a sector plan for some sectors-education and health and, later, the rural sector (see Kay article in this issue). At present, the Ortega government does not appear to have much interest in reactivating these 13 roundtables. Like Bolivia, the Nicaraguan government has been able to finance its priorities, such as the "Zero Hunger" programme, with aid from Venezuela.
The fact that, as of 2008, governments in all three countries had found donors willing to finance their political priorities and campaign promises shows a kind of government leadership over the aid process in recent years, but not in the form that the Paris Declaration stipulates and with hardly any donor coordination.
Programme based approaches
Programme aid is the most advanced form of aid within programme based approaches. Before 
Budget Support and the Paris Agenda
In theory, budget support is the aid modality most likely to achieve the principles of the Paris Declaration. In this section, we examine whether this assumption is true for both general and sector budget support. We look at the extent of harmonization and alignment within budget support, as well as the links between budget support and ownership, conditionality and results orientation, and finally the predictability of aid, which is an aspect of mutual accountability. All in all, it is clear that multiple (sector) budget support systems exist, and even with joint systems, donor harmonization is far from complete. Moreover, not all sector budget support programmes are fully aligned with national systems. The IDB fiscal sector programme in Bolivia was managed from a separate implementation unit and used a special account. For the EC decentralization programme in Honduras, the government itself set up a separate management unit.
Conditionality, ownership, and results orientation
In order to asses the extent of ownership and leadership of the recipient government in budget support arrangements, it is necessary to assess the conditions attached to the budget support:
entry conditions, on the basis of which donors decide whether to engage in budget support (the "selectivity"), and conditions arising from the policy dialogue with the recipient government and leading to agreement on policies to be executed and targets (results) to be met. Within the latter category, a distinction can be made between "hard" and "soft"
conditions. A hard condition --a "trigger" in the terminology of the World Bank or "performance condition" for the "variable tranch" of the EC programmes (see Adam et al., 2004 ) --must be met before (partial) disbursement takes place.
The entry conditions or selection criteria for most donors included (i) macro-economic stability--usually operationalized as a current IMF agreement --;(ii) a PRSP or similar development strategy; (iii) minimum guarantees with respect to government financial management; and , (iv) overall trust in the government and governance (Vos and Cabezas, 2004) . For providing balance of payments support, an IMF agreement and some overall trust in the government were usually sufficient, thus the new aid paradigm seems to have raised the bar for obtaining budget support.
In practice, an IMF programme and some trust in government and governance continued to be the most important entry conditions, while the other two conditions proved to be less critical. 
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Compared to the situation before 2000, conditions have also become "harder". The lack of an approved PRSP was not a barrier for starting the multi-donor budget support programme in
Bolivia, yet producing an approved strategy was part of the PAM, and non-compliance with this particular requirement hampered disbursement by some donors, even though the majority of the other conditions had been met. The World Bank and the IDB use an increasing number of "pre-conditions" (conditions to be met before the first disbursement) and "triggers" (to be met before disbursement of a second tranch). The IDB introduced, next to the policy based loans, a "performance based loan" with disbursement on the basis of results. In the EC sector programmes, disbursement of the variable tranch can be reduced to zero or to 50 per cent depending on the degree of achievement of the defined (quantitative and qualitative) targets for the sector. All this means tougher conditionality, or higher chances of non-disbursement or partial disbursement of the committed money.
It can be concluded that selectivity does not seem to have increased, nor has national ownership of the policies to be implemented or of the targets and indicators to be achieved with budget support. Together these two trends mean that chances of conditions being implemented with budget support are not higher than with the previous forms of programme aid: cosmetic implementation, partial implementation, or delays are still likely. Moreover, as conditionality is now more often linked to disbursement, there is likely to be more variability in aid flows.
The predictability of budget support
For budget support, predictability of aid flows is even more important than for project aid since the resources are part of the general revenues that may also be used for current 
The Paris Agenda and SWAps and common funds
We next look at the implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration in three specific cases of SWAps or common funds, one each from Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia. All three cases involve coordinated support by multiple donors for a sector-wide or sub-sector plan or strategy and are therefore considered programme based approaches. Of the three, Nicaragua's sector-wide programme in rural development --PRORURAL --most closely approximates a true SWAp. It is organized around a plan for the rural productive sector and encompasses many projects (many of which predate the plan) and a common fund. Honduras'
Education for All is a sub-sector programme in primary education, which is also supported by a combination of projects and a common fund. The "education basket" in Bolivia is a common fund originally created in 2004 to support a Multi-Annual Operational Plan (POMA)
for the education sector.
Ownership and leadership
In order to consider to what extent the three programmes represent progress towards achieving national ownership and leadership of the aid process, we first examine the plans that provided the initiative for each agreement. On this point, the three examples are quite different. In Bolivia, the impulse for starting an education basket was to support the Education Ministry's own multi-annual operational plan (POMA). PRORURAL is also built around a sector plan that was developed over time by the institutions involved in the rural development sector in Nicaragua and through numerous consultative processes (see Kay article in this issue). However, the content of the programme (e.g. the projects and activities funded through PRORURAL) includes many projects that were largely donor-driven initiatives. The EFA programme in Honduras was a joint government and donor initiative, but its content is mainly determined by donors. The objectives, teaching measures, proposals for institutional reforms, and textbooks in the EFA programme were all created and designed by donors like USAID, World Bank, and Japan.
PRSPs or national development plans were not the basis of the sector and sub-sector plans in any of the three cases. PRORURAL was developed in parallel to Nicaragua's second PRSP, and by a different group within the government, which led to some contradictions between the two plans.. This experience is not unique to PRORURAL or to Nicaragua: PRSPs tend to be developed under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance or the Presidency, whereas the development of sector plans is usually under the auspices of sector ministries. This could potentially mean that sector-based plans enjoy more ownership among the officials charged with implementing them. However, even if this is the case, these three cases demonstrate that it is hard to maintain government leadership and ownership over the life of the sector plans, and particularly after a change in government.
In Bolivia, the Morales government quickly rejected the Education POMA created under President Mesa. In the interest of keeping the education basket running, the donors decided to be flexible and support any new government initiative that had the same general goals as the rejected POMA. This led to donors approving requests for particular expenditures from the basket, without an official guiding plan. In Nicaragua, the change of government did not lead to a rejection of PRORURAL, but the Ortega government is going outside of the PRORURAL donor framework to find support for its key rural development programmes.
The major supporter of the government's flagship programme Zero Hunger, for example, is Venezuela, a country that is not a party to PRORURAL. There may still be ownership of PRORURAL, but the government's key priorities lie elsewhere. In Honduras, donors had to remind the Zelaya government (2006) of the existence of the EFA programme (De Jong et al., 2008) . Donor disbursements and implementation stagnated until the government eventually gave its general support to continuation of the programme.
Results orientation and mutual accountability
Donors participating in a common fund or basket within a SWAp usually have some additional entry requirements or set some conditions for disbursement. In these three cases, The eleven donors in Honduras' Education for All programme also signed a Memorandum of Understanding and participate in a roundtable for the education sector. Six donors contribute to the common fund (Sweden, KfW, Canada, Spain, the EC, and, to a limited extent, the World Bank). The fund establishes the common conditions for disbursement. However, the procedures are based on a format that the World Bank uses for projects and these procedures are not always consistent with national standards and systems (Salomonsson and Sjölander, 2005 ).
Bolivia's education basket, in contrast, adopted local accounting and financial procedures.
Donor coordination, however, is limited. It started with only three donors and now has four.
At various points in the past there has been a functioning education roundtable for wider sector coordination, but many of the current government's key priorities for the sector (such as a new alphabetization campaign) are financed by Venezuela and Cuba, who do not participate in these discussions.
Administrative and financial practices are in some ways reminiscent of projects with little evidence of alignment. In the Bolivian education basket and in EFA's common fund, there is more attention to using national systems than was the case with projects, but donors are still asked to approve specific expenditures. Nicaragua's PRORURAL had 38 different sources of financing in 2006, many still with different procedures.
Conclusions
The new aid paradigm that was adopted around the year 2000 assumes that nationally owned, predecessors. This suggests that it was unrealistic to think countries were able to create and maintain a broadly shared, long-term consensus on a strategy to reduce poverty. It was also unrealistic to expect strategic plans to provide operational guidance for aid efforts or convincing evidence of government commitment to reduce poverty.
Second, PRSPs and other national plans proved to be hardly relevant for the decision to provide general budget support. An approved PRSP was not necessary for the Bolivian multidonor budget support programme to be established, and it was not sufficient for a joint budget support scheme to appear in Honduras. Apart from this, the composition of the donor group mattered for the volume of budget support. There is much less general budget support in
Honduras due to absence of the UK, the Netherlands, and most Nordic donors (except Sweden)
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. On paper, the new aid paradigm would bring about more selectivity in the decision 28 to provide programme aid (budget support). This would reduce the need for conditions during the process and would thus facilitate domestic ownership. But in practice, having a PRSP and financial management criteria hardly played a role in this decision; the main criteria for determining whether or not to provide budget support continued to be whether there was an IMF agreement in place (for macroeconomic stability) and some trust in governance. Yet, although entry conditions did not become tougher, the share of programme aid decreased rather than increased after 2000, under the changed aid paradigm. This can be explained by the fact that donors sometimes compensated a lack of selectivity ex ante (in the decision to engage in budget support at all) with more extensive and tougher conditionality within the programmes. This reduced the actual flows as well as the predictability of budget support, and thus affected the principle of mutual accountability.
Third, the experiences with the SWAps and common funds examined in this paper show that these programme based approaches do not have much relation with the PRSPs either. In practice, SWAps were based on sector plans, but these were sometimes formulated with great influence of the donors. And even when there was ownership by one government, subsequent administrations rarely embraced the plans and sector support schemes of previous governments. Existing SWAps retain characteristics of projects in many cases --with independent execution units and many different procedures required by the involved donors.
The overall experience reflects the real and largely underestimated difficulties in advancing towards the implementation of the Paris agenda. The path has not been made any easier in Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua by the frequent, contested changes of government and period of political instability. Fundamentally, however, the basis for the new aid paradigm --a broadly shared and operational strategy that would act as proof of commitment to reduce 29 poverty --proved unrealistic. As a result, individual priorities, procedures and systems remained dominant, both among donors and among (and within) recipient governments. Endnotes 1. Programme aid is aid that is not tied to specific projects, but is usually accompanied by policy conditions (OECD, 1991) .
2. General and sector budget support are forms of programme aid and are thus not earmarked.
In the case of sector budget support, the policy dialogue focuses on one sector in particular, while with general budget support the policy dialogue may focus on any aspect of public policies and governance. In sector wide approaches (SWAps), donors work together to support a sector or sometimes sub-sector. This usually includes common funds or baskets in which donors pool their funds, but donors may also support separate projects as long as they are in line with the country's sector strategy. 
